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NOTES
A Chance for the Ragan, Court To Redeem Itself:
Chappell v. Rouch
A Kansas resident brought an action for personal injuries against an Indiana
resident in the federal district court of Kansas. The action grew out of an auto-
mobile accident occurring in Kansas. The defendant filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment based on the running of the two-year statute of limitations.
Although the plaintiff had filed the complaint before the running of the statute,
under Kansas law the statute is tolled by service of summons, and the plaintiff
did not effect service until after the limitations period had run. The district
court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The defendant
appealed the order. Held, affirmed: The federal rule relating to commence-
ment of an action rather than the state statute is to be applied in determining
whether a diversity action had been commenced within the limitations period.
Chappell v. Rouch, 448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).
I. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CONFLICTING
WITH STATE LAW-ERIE TO HANNA
In 1938 the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins held that in di-
versity of citizenship cases the federal courts were to apply the substantive law
of the state in which they were sitting.! In the same year, under the authority
of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,' the Court promulgated the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were intended
to establish uniform procedural law in the federal courts, their application
theoretically does not violate the mandate of Erie, which requires that the
federal courts apply state substantive law4 when sitting in diversity jurisdiction
cases. But the problem inherent in the application of the Erie doctrine is the
familiar one of determining the distinction between substance and procedure.
The problem typically arises when a federal rule which may superficially be
labeled procedural conflicts with some feature of arguably applicable state
law. In the aftermath of the Erie decision two tests were fashioned to solve
the problem of which law to apply. In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co*2 the Court
held that if a federal rule could rationally be classified as procedural it should
apply instead of the conflicting state rule. The Sibbach test was premised upon
the authority of the Rules Enabling Acte and the policy of establishing uni-
form procedural rules for federal courts.
In contrast to the Sibbach approach is Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
1304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which had required fed-
eral courts to apply "federal general common law." Erie held that there was no federal
general common law. 304 U.S. at 66. The twin aims of the Erie doctrine were the dis-
couragement of forum shopping and the prevention of the inequitable administration of the
laws.
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1971).
' For a discussion of whether Erie and the federal rules conflicted, see Clark, The Tomp-
kins Case and the Federal Rules, 24 J. AM. JuD. SoC'Y 158 (1941).
5312 U.S. 1 (1941).628 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72 (1971).
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Guaranty Trust Co. v. York The York test, which is commonly referred to
as the outcome-determinative test, concludes that a court should not solve
Erie-type problems by a traditional substance-procedure distinction, but rather
by an approach based on whether the use of the federal rule, instead of the
conflicting state rule, would significantly affect the outcome of the litigation.!
Too often, however, courts were inclined to apply the outcome-determinative
test mechanically without regard to the true spirit of the Erie decision. Such
was the case in Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co! There the
Court mechanically applied the York outcome-determinative test and con-
cluded that the state law controlled and that the statute of limitations had,
therefore, run at the time the summons had been served."
Since the application of many procedural rules is outcome-determinative at
some stage of the litigation, the Erie doctrine, as redefined by York and me-
chanically applied in Ragan, caused great uncertainty with respect to the status
of the federal rules in diversity cases." This uncertainty was somewhat allevi-
ated in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Cooperative, Inc.," in which the Supreme Court
retreated from the York outcome-determinative formula by holding that while
a state rule must be applied if it is an integral part of a state-created right, a
balancing of state and federal interests should otherwise determine whether
state law controls." Hanna v. Plumer," the next decision refining the York
rule, is significant because it discarded the mechanical approach to outcome-
determinative analysis. It is understood to have established that the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are immune from attack as being outcome determina-
tive." The opinion in Hanna advised that the proper application of the Erie-
York doctrine requires a policy analysis in light of the twin aims of Erie, which
were the "discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable
'326 U.S. 99 (1945).
' The Court in York enunciated the rule that the "outcome of the litigation in the federal
court should be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a
litigation, as it would be if tried in the state court." Id. at 109. The outcome-determinative
test of York became the usual way of solving Erie problems. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial In-
dus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Wood v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949);
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
9337 U.S. 530 (1949). Ragan involved a highway accident between residents of differ-
ent states. The plaintiff commenced his diversity action in federal district court within the
period allowed by the state's two-year statute of limitations; however, summons had not been
served until after the statute had run. FED. R. Civ. P. 3 provides that an action is com-
menced when filed, but the state law provided the statute was not tolled until service had
been made. The Ragan Court held that the state law controlled. The Court's opinion indi-
cated that a simplistic application of the outcome-determinative test compelled its decision.
"It is conceded that if the present case were in a Kansas court it would be barred. The
theory of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York would therefore seem to bar it in the federal court,
as the Court of appeals held." Id. at 532.
"' Id. at 533.
"See Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v.
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946).
" 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
" If the federal interest is great enough, it may justify the application of the federal rule
even when it is possible that state law would have produced a different result. At issue in
Byrd was whether a particular question should be answered by the judge or by the jury.
State law indicated the former, federal law the latter. Justice Brennan found "a strong federal
policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts."
Id. at 538. The majority held this interest sufficient to overcome the general policy of uni-
formity of result.
14380 U.S. 460 (1965).
"5Id. at 471; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTs 228, 245 (2d ed. 1970).
administration of the law."1 If the application of the federal rule in the face
of a conflicting state rule would encourage either of the evils that Erie was
designed to prevent, then the state and not the federal rule should be applied.
As a result of the policy approach of Hanna, the Court broadened the Byrd
standard of "affirmative countervailing considerations" in favor of federal
court independence, but at the same time recognized the constitutional limita-
tions of federal power in rule-making. There is some doubt whether Ragan
remains good authority after Hanna." However, although the Court in Hanna
referred to Ragan, it carefully refrained from overruling it. In fact it has been
argued that the United States Supreme Court in Hanna interpreted the Ragan
decision to mean that rule 318 does not speak to the question of commencement
for purposes of a state statute of limitations. Therefore, since no federal rule
governed the point in dispute in that case, Erie commanded the enforcement
of state law. Such an interpretation might indicate why the Court refused
specifically to overrule Ragan and explain how the Court could read the two
cases consistently. " Thus, some lower courts have reasoned that until the Su-
preme Court itself "overrules its very positive statements in Ragan," they must
follow its holdings in cases directly governed by the Ragan decision."
II. FEDERAL RULE 3 VERSUS STATE LAW-THE CONFLICT
BETWEEN RAGAN AND HANNA
Because of both the difficulty of reading a consistent approach into Ragan
and Hanna and the refusal of Hanna explicitly to overrule Ragan, it is not at
all surprising that the lower courts have not been uniform in their subsequent
decisions on the scope of rule 3. Since Hanna a number of cases have been
decided involving the effect of rule 3 in tolling state statutes of limitations."'
In approximately half of these decisions the state commencement-of-action pro-
vision has been held to control, while in the other half rule 3 has been held to
govern. Very few cases have considered the question of whether rule 3 was
sufficiently broad to cover the issue of commencement for limitations purposes.
In most cases the courts have assumed that rule 3 was designed to cover such
an issue."
State Procedure Controls. Groninger v. DavisonW' was a diversity suit for per-
1 380 U.S. at 468.
"See Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); Groninger v.
Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60 (4th
Cir. 1965).18 FED. R. CIv. P. 3.
19 C. WRIGHT, supra note 15, at 246.
"
0 See, e.g., Groninger v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 1966).
"
t See, e.g., Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co., 398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); Groninger
v. Davison, 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966); Sylvester v. Messler, 351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966); McCrea v. General Motors Corp., 53 F.R.D.
384 (D. Mont. 1971); Gatliff v. Little Audrey's Transp. Co., 317 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Neb.
1970); Wheeler v. Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 311 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); O'Shea
v. Binswanger, 42 F.R.D. 21 (D. Md. 1967).
" See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumner, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co.,
398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968); Wheeler v. Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 311 F. Supp. 1177
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).23 364 F.2d 638 (8th Cir. 1966).
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sonal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The Eighth Circuit held
that under an Iowa statute of limitations the plaintiff's claim was barred when
the complaint was filed in time but the summons was not effected until after
the expiration of the two-year period. The court held the case to be controlled
by Ragan. The court concluded that "while it is difficult to reconcile Hanna v.
Plummer ... with the holding in Ragan, we nevertheless must conclude that
the majority of the Supreme Court, in supporting the opinion written by the
Chief Justice, felt that it was not an overruling of Ragan."'4 Like Groninger,
O'Shea v. Binswangere was a diversity suit for personal injuries sustained in an
automobile accident. The court relied on Ragan as a "broad holding" that the
federal court must look to state law to determine when the statute of limita-
tions is tolled, and maintained that Ragan had not been overruled by Hanna.'
Both Groninger and O'Shea based their holdings on the Ragan case. Yet they
may be distinguished from the very case upon which they rely. There was no
finding in either O'Shea or Groninger that the commencement provision was
an integral part of the statute of limitations. In fact, the commencement pro-
vision in both cases was located in a separate codification of rules of procedure,
which indicated that it was a general-purpose definition and not specifically
related to the statute of limitations. However, the reliance upon Ragan may
be based upon the language used by the Court in Hanna to the effect that Erie
did not command displacement of a federal rule by an inconsistent state rule,
but rather that when the scope of the federal rule was not sufficiently broad
to cover the issue in dispute, Erie required in federal court whatever would be
required in a similar suit in state court.
Another case holding that compliance with rule 3 did not serve to toll the
state statute of limitations was Sylvester v. Messler.!8 In that case the Michigan
statute of limitations provided for tolling when the complaint and summons
were actually served." The district court held that the commencement pro-
vision was an integral part of the Michigan statute of limitations.' Citing
Ragan, the court said that the plaintiff's action was barred. The court of appeals
affirmed, rejecting plaintiff's contention that Ragan had been overruled by
Hanna. Since in this case the commencement provision was considered to be
an integral part of the statute of limitations of the state of Michigan, Sylvester
is more nearly in accord with the "integral part test" derived from Ragan than
either Groninger or O'Shea.
In 1970 two more cases were decided in which courts relied on Ragan in
reaching their decisions." In both of these cases the courts concluded that if
a suit was based on a right created by federal law, the filing of a complaint as
Id. at 642.
*42 F.R.D. 21 (D. Md. 1967).
88 As a result the court found that the state law of Maryland governed with respect to
when the statute of limitations is tolled.
" 380 U.S. at 471.
28351 F.2d 472 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1011 (1966).
29MICH. COMP. LAws § 27A.5856 (1962).
" Sylvester v. Messier, 246 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Mich. 1964).
8 Anderson v. Phoenix of Hartford Ins. Co., 320 F. Supp. 399 (W.D. La. 1970); Gat-
liff v. Little Audrey's Transp. Co., 317 F. Supp. 1117 (D. Neb. 1970). See also Hoffman
v. Holden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 825 (1947).
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called for by rule 3 was sufficient without more to satisfy the statute of limi-
tations. Despite rule 3, however, when the suit was on a state-created right, the
plaintiff must, before the statute of limitations has run, do whatever he would
be required to do in a similar suit in state court."
Federal Rule 3 Controls. There were also several cases decided subsequent to
Hanna in which the courts held that the commencement of an action pursuant
to rule 3 tolled the state statute of limitations despite arguments that Ragan
compelled application of the state rule. In Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co.3
the court held that Ragan, which if still good law would require application of
the state rule, had been overruled by Hanna, so that rule 3 was applicable. The
court recognized that a number of courts, not without justification, had con-
tinued to follow Ragan since Hanna had not specifically overruled Ragan.
However, the court said that rule 3 was designed to cover the issue of com-
mencement for purposes of the statute of limitations. Futhermore, Hanna did
represent a modification or at least a refinement of the outcome-determinative
test as applied in Ragan, and it enunciated a policy favoring the supremacy
of the federal rules which was not discussed in Ragan. Consequently Hanna
required consideration of the factors underlying the choice between the state
and federal rule rather than the automatic application of Ragan, namely the
twin aims of Erie, which were the prevention of forum-shopping and the pre-
vention of the unequal administration of law. Applying these principles to the
facts of the case, the court in Sylvestri concluded that rule 3 was the proper
measure of the commencement of this action for purposes of the statute of
limitations.4
Using the policy analysis that was announced in Hanna and relying on the
decision in Sylvestri, a district court in New York in Wheeler v. Standard Tool
& Manufacturing Co." held that a diversity action for personal injuries com-
menced as provided by federal rule 3 was not barred by the state statute of limi-
tations. The court pointed out that use of rule 3 as a proper measure to decide
if the action was commenced for limitations purposes would not result in
forum-shopping. The court said that the plaintiff had the choice of commencing
the action in either the state or the federal court and had not been forced to
resort to the federal court because of inability to effectuate service of summons
prior to expiration of the three-year state statute of limitations. Turning to the
second aim of Erie in its policy analysis, the court concluded that federal rule
3 did not substantially alter the character or outcome of the litigation from the
consequences that would follow in the state court.
In a 1971 decision, McCrea v. General Motors Corp.," a district court in a
brief opinion held that federal rule 3, rather than a Montana statute,3 7 governed
the determination of whether a Montana diversity action was barred by the
Montana statute of limitations. Relying on the decision in Sylvestri, the court
320 F. Supp. at 401; 317 F. Supp. at 1119.
398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
id. at 605, 606.
'311 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
3"53 F.R.D. 384 (D. Mont. 1971).3 7
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 93-2601, -2605 (1947).
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pointed out that courts should look to federal law for a definition of the term
"commencement of action in the federal courts."' In federal courts "a civil
action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court."'" The court con-
cluded its opinion by saying that it preferred the certainty that a literal appli-
cation of such a rule brought to limitations problems. Although the case did
not speak specifically of either Ragan or Hanna, it did recognize the strong
federal interest in uniformity of procedure in the federal courts-an interest
which the Court had discussed in Hanna.
III. CHAPPELL V. RoucI-I
In Chappell v. Rouch4' the Tenth Circuit held that rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure applied, rather than the Kansas state statute, in de-
termining whether a diversity action had been commenced within the limita-
tions period. By holding that rule 3 controlled, the court obviated the necessity
of passing upon the related matters of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the at-
tempted service within the limitations period. However, the Tenth Circuit
based its decision on reasoning somewhat different from that of the district
court. The district court, while recognizing the factual similarity of the instant
case and Ragan, was persuaded by Sylvestri v. Warner & Swasey Co.4 and that
court's analysis of the effect of Hanna on Ragan. Using that analysis, the dis-
trict court concluded that Hanna had sufficiently modified Ragan to the extent
that federal rule 3 controlled the point at which an action was commenced for
purposes of the statute of limitations. The court of appeals avoided the question
of whether Hanna modified or overruled Ragan. Although it agreed with the
trial court that Hanna governed, the court was of the opinion that Chappell
was distinguishable on its facts from the Ragan case and that, therefore, a reso-
lution of the Hanna-Ragan controversy was not necessary.
The court advanced two bases for its decision. The first ground advanced by
the court was that the Kansas commencement-of-action statute4' was merely
procedural and not an integral part of the applicable Kansas statute of limi-
tations;" therefore, Ragan did not govern. The second was that since the Kan-
sas commencement statute was purely procedural it was in direct conflict with
rule 3. Concluding that under Hanna the federal rule should control in such a
case, the court held that rule 3 took precedence over the Kansas commence-
ment statute.
In distinguishing Chappell from Ragan, a case intermediately decided by
this same court some twenty-two years earlier,44 the court emphasized that the
Kansas statutes under consideration in Ragan were not the same statutes by
which the present case was governed.' The statutes in Ragan were all within
"153 F.R.D. at 385, quoting 398 F.2d at 604.
"FED. R. CIv. P. 3.40448 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1971).
41398 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1968).
42KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-203 (1971).431d. §§ 60-501, -513.
"170 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
' The statutes applicable to the Ragan case were Law of May 29, 1935, ch. 182, §§ 17,
19, 58, (1935] Kan. Laws 1909 (repealed 1963). These statutes read as follows: Section
60-301-" 'A civil action may be commenced in a court of record by filing in the office of
(Vol. 26
chapter 60 of the General Statutes of Kansas, entitled "Procedure, Civil." They
were also all within article 3 of chapter 60, entitled "Commencement and
Limitation of Actions." Interpreting the language and context of those statutes,
the court in Ragan concluded that a statute defining how and when an action
was deemed commenced was so intertwined with the two-year statute of limi-
tations that it became an integral part thereof to the end that it took precedence
over rule 3. The court pointed out that the plain import from their decision
in Ragan was that in the absence of a determination that the two state statutes
were integrally connected, the applicable federal rule would control. With the
revision of the Kansas statutes in 1964, the commencement of action statute
still came within chapter 60; however, it became a part of article 2, which
was labeled "Rules of Civil Procedure." The limitations provisions were in-
corporated in article 5 under the heading "Limitations of Actions." The court
observed that as a result of the revision there was no section in article 5 simi-
lar to the one in Ragan that specifically provided when an action was com-
menced with respect to the statute of limitations. Rather, the court pointed out
that the commencement-of-action provision now located in article 2 was not an
integral part of the applicable Kansas statute of limitations, but was purely a
state rule of procedure.
Since the state commencement statute was purely procedural in nature, the
court concluded that there existed a direct conflict between it and rule 3, even
though it failed to discuss why rule 3 was sufficiently broad to cover commence-
ment for purposes of the state statute of limitations. Assuming that there was a
conflict between the two provisions, the court looked to Hanna for a resolution
of the issue of which provision took precedence. Borrowing from Hanna, the
court concluded: "Erie and its offspring are not the appropriate test of the va-
lidity and applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and cast no doubt
on the long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for
federal courts even though some of those rules will inevitably differ from com-
parable state rules."'
The court's analysis seems to be founded on the proposition that a state
statute of limitations is "substantive," '47 and as such the federal courts do not
have the power to vary its operation. Therefore, a state commencement re-
the clerk of the proper court a petition, and causing a summons to be issued thereon.'" 170
F.2d at 991. Section 60-306---"[A personal injury action] must be brought within two years
after it has accrued." Id. Section 60-308-" 'An action shall be deemed commenced within
the meaning of this article, as to each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served
on him ....'" Id. at 992 (emphasis added). All three of these provisions were in the same
article of the Kansas statutes.
The statutes applicable to the Chappell case as promulgated in 1964 were KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 60-203, -501, -513 (1971), and read as follows: "Sec. 60-203. A civil action is
commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the court, provided service of process is ob-
tained .. .within ninety days after the petition is filed; otherwise the action is deemed com-
menced at the time of service of process ....." "Sec. 60-501. The provisions of this article
govern the limitation of time for commencing civil actions, except where a different limita-
tion is specifically provided by statute." "Sec. 60-513(4). An action for injury to the rights
of another, not arising on contract and not herein enumerated . . .shall be brought within
two (2) years."
The court in Chappell placed great emphasis on the fact that in the revised statutes the
commencement of action provision was in art. 2, "Rules of Civil Procedure," and not a part
of art. 5, entitled "Limitations of Actions."
4 448 F.2d at 450, quoting 380 U.S. at 473.
'See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
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quirement, when it is an integral part of the statute of limitations, must acquire
substantive character and, therefore, take precedence over the federal rule.
Likewise, when the commencement provision is not physically connected with
the statute of limitations, but located under the heading "Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure," it would be classified as procedural and, thus, subordinated to the
federal rule on the reasoning of Hanna. Such an analysis seems to put too great
an emphasis on the physical location of the provision in the state statutes and
totally disregards the holding of Hanna, namely that the Erie-York, outcome-
determinative, substance-procedure approach cannot be mechanically followed
as in Ragan, but must be read in light of the underlying policies of Erie.4" This
was the approach taken in Sylvestri.0 Had the court in Chappell made the type
of policy analysis that Hanna suggested, it would have reached the same result
on seemingly firmer grounds.
The application of rule 3 definitely would not have resulted in forum shop-
ping. When the original complaint was filed, there was more than sufficient
time for the summons to be served before the expiration of the statutory period,
and, therefore, the possible availability of rule 3 could not have played any
part in the plaintiff's choice of courts. Likewise, the application of rule 3 rather
than the Kansas rule would not so change the character or result of the litiga-
tion as to discriminate against citizens of Kansas. In any event, the plaintiffs
were the Kansas citizens, not the defendant. But instead of following this
sounder approach to the case, the court in Chappell took the opportunity to
distinguish the instant case from its earlier decision in Ragan on the flimsy
basis of the physical location of two groups of statutes almost identical in sub-
stance. Furthermore, the court seemed to disregard the language of the Supreme
Court in Hanna, by assuming that rule 3 was designed to cover commencement
for the purposes of the statute of limitations. Although federal courts have
consistently applied rule 3, for purposes of commencement of a statute of limi-
tations the rule itself does not mention tolling of a statute of limitations and
the United States Supreme Court has not specifically spoken upon that exact
point. But certainly its language in Hanna referring to the Ragan case would
seem to suggest that rule 3 is not sufficiently broad to cover the tolling of a
statute of limitations."° If that is so, then state commencement provisions will
apply in all statute-of-limitations cases since there will be no federal rule in
direct conflict with the applicable state provision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Chappell court fails to clear up any of the confusion surrounding the
applicability of rule 3. Although it does not follow Ragan, it does use the in-
4 380 U.S. at 468.
" 398 F.2d at 598.
80 It is true that there have been cases where this court has held applicable a
state rule in the face of an argument that the situation was governed by one
of the federal rules. But the holding of each such case was not that Erie com-
manded displacement of a federal rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather
that the scope of the federal rule was not as broad as the losing party urged
and therefore there being no federal rule which covered the point in dispute,
Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.
380 U.S. at 471.
[Vol. 26
